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The Supreme Court and
Its Critics
As Supreme Court correspondent for the New York
Times, Mr. Lewis has daily to grapple with both the substance of the Court's decisions and the impact of those
decisions on our society. In this Article, his treatment of
those critics who reason from results (or who fail to
reason at all) reveals the sure hand of one who is accustomed to assessing public reaction to social change. His
penetrating analysis of the Court's many-faceted social
role-in answer to those who would restrict the Court's
power of judicial review-displays a perspective that can
perhaps come only to one as close to the Court as is Mr.
Lewis. And that perspective stands him in as good stead in
his examination of informed and academic criticism as of
"know-nothing" criticism. It entitles him to conclude that
while the Supreme Court seriously needs continuous and
searching criticism, its critics must understand that the
practical necessity of reaching agreement and the moral
necessity of resolving great social issues often severely
limit the Court's ability adequately to rationalize its results.

Anthony Lewis*
TRODUCTION
Criticism of the Supreme Court of the United States is, of
course, no new phenomenon. More than a century ago Jefferson
called federal judges "a subtle corps of sappers and miners" working to undermine the republic.' His language was relatively mild
for that day.' John Marshall became so discouraged that he wrote
his colleague Justice Story gloomy letters forecasting an early and
successful effort by Congress to "prostrate the judiciary."'
* A.B., Harvard, 1948. Nieman Fellow, Harvard Law School, 1956-1957.
Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times. (This Article is

based on a speech previously printed in the New York Law Journal.-Ed.)

1.

HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

46 (1928).

2. See generally Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States, 47 AM. L. REv. 1, 161 (1913).
3. 1 WA:uRN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 727
(rev. ed. 1937).
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The criticism today falls into three broad categories: abusive
criticism motivated largely by the results reached in particular
cases, criticism of the Court's exercise of the power of judicial
review of legislation, and academic criticism directed chiefly at
the reasons the Court gives for its results.
I. RESULT-ORIENTED CRITICISM
The body of criticism that is the largest in volume, and the loudest, is what might be termed result-oriented. The fundamental characteristic of this type of criticism is that it is more concerned with
the results reached by the Court than with the reasons for those resuits. Thus the Jencks case,4 holding that federal criminal defendants were entitled to check pre-trial statements by government witnesses against their trial testimony, was attacked in good part because Mr. Jencks was allegedly a Communist. One wonders what
the critics would have said if the principle had been laid down in
the case of a criminal antitrust action against a large corporation.
Decisions involving, one way or another, Communists and suspected Communists have been a major target of vituperative, unreasoned criticism.' A good example was an editorial in the New
York Daily News,' which began:
Everywhere you go, almost everyone you know has his or her own

theory as to what's wrong with the Earl Warren Supreme Court. (A
handful of people-mainly Communists and fellow-travelers-think the
Court is strictly okay.)

Perhaps the ultimate example of result-oriented criticism was a
chart made by a United States Senator showing the number of
times each member of the Court had "voted in accordance with
the position advocated by Communists."' The complete assumption there was that facts and law are irrelevant if Communists support the position of one side in a pending case. That side must
lose, or else the Court is pro-Communist.
4. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
5. In a column on Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957), David
Lawrence wrote:
The Supreme Court of the United States has crippled the effectiveness of congressional investigations. By one sweeping decision, the

court has opened the way to Communists, traitors, disloyal citizens
and crooks of all kinds . . . to refuse to answer any questions which
the witness arbitrarily decides for himself are not "pertinent" to a legislative purpose. . . . Naturally, Moscow should be happy. ...
The Communist "Daily Worker" editorials have assumed all along
that the court would decide some day as it did this week, that a man
can betray his country and in certain circumstances get away with it.

Washington Evening Star, June 19, 1957, p. A27, col. 1 (metropolitan ed.).
6. Nov. 23, 1959, p. 33.
7. The chart was the work of Senator Eastland of Mississippi. See 104
CONG. REc. 13343-44 (1958).
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The school segregation cases, decided in Brown v. Board of
Education,' undoubtedly represent the single most important rea-

son for contemporary animosity toward the Court. Southern
judges and lawyers who might be expected to know better have

joined Southern politicians and newspaper editors in denouncing
the Brown decision as immoral, illegal, even unconstitutional.
One of the curiosities of the attack has been the veneration paid

by these Southern critics to the rule of separate but equal accommodations for Negroes which the Supreme Court abandoned in
1954. This veneration is a little tardy, to say the least. The South

in fact made no real effort to provide equal schooling for Negroes during many decades after Plessy v. Ferguson'° established
the separate but equal doctrine in 1896. As recently as 1944 the
average current expenditure per pupil in six Southeastern states

was less than half as much in Negro schools as in white." Figures
from earlier in this century are even more shocking.'2 It was only
when the trend of Supreme Court opinions beginning in the 1930's

and 1940's made it clear that the legal basis of segregation was
threatened that the South began spending those vast sums on

Negro education that we now hear so much about.
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See, e.g., Act No. 2, 1960 Extraordinary Session, Louisiana Legislature, "An Act to interpose the sovereignty of the State of Louisiana
against the unlawful encroachments by the judicial and executive branches
of the Federal Government in the operation of public schools of the
State of Louisiana, which constitute a deliberate, palpable and dangerous
exercise of governmental powers not granted to the United States by the
United States Constitution... ." Or see Resolution Requesting Impeachment of Six Members of the United States Supreme Court, 1 Georgia
Laws 1957, 553-68, accusing the Justices inter alia of "undertaking by
judicial decrees to carry out Communist policies." Or see the Southern
Manifesto, 102 CoNG. REC. 4460 (1956). Or see the Augusta (Ga.) Courier, Oct. 13, 1958: "His [man's] rights and his liberties are in the laps
of the nine crazy men who sit on the Supreme Court bench ....
They
are the most dangerous tyrants that ever existed. Like Hitler, Mussolini
and the other modem-day tyrants, they are mentally deranged ..
(Quoted in Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, Address at Brandeis University, Nov. 12, 1958, p. 2 (mimeographed text).
10. 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
11. SWANSON & GRiFFIN, PuBLIc EDUCATION IN THE SouTH 63
(1955). A table shows average expenditures per pupil of each race from
1931-1932 to 1951-1952 in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina and South Carolina. The Negro figure rises from 29.6 per cent
of the white in 1931-1932 to 44 per cent in 1941-1942 and 73.4 per
cent in 1951-1952. Another table shows that average annual teachers'
salaries in the eleven Southern states and Oklahoma in 1939-1940 were
$505 for Nego teachers and $962 for white. Id. at 59.
12. In 1915 in South Carolina the expenditure per pupil was $23.76 in
white schools, $2.91 in Negro schools; on the average there were 36 white
children per teacher, 64 Negro children; the value of school property per
child was $32.11 in the white schools, $2.57 in the Negro schools. HM LAN,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 208 (1958).
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Although the result-oriented critics often talk about the need
for "self-restraint" on the part of the Supreme Court, even selfrestraint does not please them when it leads to the wrong result.
An example was Frank v. Maryland.3 Over the strong protest
of four dissenters, the Court held that the federal constitution
does not compel every local health inspector in the country to obtain a warrant before gaining entry to a house which he has good
reason to believe is a source of disease. Logically, one should call
the decision a triumph of self-restraint, not to mention states'
rights. The majority declined to put another constitutional limitation on local action. But the day after the decision Dale Alford,
a segregationist Congressman from Little Rock, Arkansas, said of
the decision: "Once again the oath-breaking usurpers destroyed
one of our basic freedoms .... "I"
This is know-nothing criticism. It is nonintellectual, indeed
anti-intellectual. It often includes the suggestion of bad motives
on the part of the Justices, a suggestion conveyed by such language
as "judicial usurpation" and "judicial tyranny." Robert A. Girard
has said that such epithetssignify nothing more than that their author either agrees or does not
agree with a particular decision or group of decisions by the Court. If
he thinks the court should not have interfered as it did, then you have

"judicial legislation" or, even worse, "judicial usurpation," depending
upon the intensity of the author's conviction. If the court should have
stepped in when it did not, the result is "judicial abnegation." On the
other hand, if the Court's response meets his fancy, then you are blessed with "judicial restraint" or "judicial statesmanship." It has always
seemed to me that if all an author has to say is that he thinks the
Court is mistaken or unwise in its decisions, he would do a great
service by speaking in concrete terms of mistake or absence of wisdom which are at once more meaningful and less likely to inflame
than such provocative terms as "judicial usurpation," "judicial abnegation," and the rest.' 5

But it goes without saying that Mr. Girard's plea is not likely to
get very far with the know-nothing critics. Their very purpose is
to inflame. Epithets are more useful for that purpose than reasoned argument.
Under the same general heading of result-oriented criticism
must go some efforts which bear more impressive intellectual credentials. Among these are the 1958 report of the Conference of
(State) Chief Justices' Committee on Federal-State Relationships
as Affected by Judicial Decisions; 6 the 1959 report of the Ameri13.
14.
15.
16.

359 U.S. 360 (1959).
105 CONG. REc. 7505 (1959).
Girard, Book Review, 11 STAN. L. REv. 800, 804 (1959).
The report is printed at 104 CONG. REc. A7782 (1958).

19611

THE COURT AND ITS CRITICS

309

can Bar Association's Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives; and the work of some newspaper columnists
who write frequently about the Supreme Court.
The report of the chief justices' committee is a hybrid document. After a historical outline of our federal system"8 the report
cites a number of areas of the law in which Supreme Court decisions during the last few decades have altered the federal-state
balance.' 9 There are lengthy discussions of cases imposing restraints on state legislative investigations, 20 state control of admissions to the bar2 ' and state administration of criminal law.2
The tone is reasoned, if critical. But then comes a section labeled
"Conclusions." These are, inter alia, that the Supreme Court "tot.
often has tended to adopt the role of policy-maker without proper
judicial restraint,"3 that "the overall tendency" of its decisions
"over the last 25 years or more has been to press the extension of
federal power and to press it rapidly,"2 4 that the Court "in many
cases arising under the 14th amendment has assumed what seem
to us primarily legislative powers,"' ' and-last but not leastthat "any study of recent decisions of the Supreme Court will raise
at least considerable doubt as to the validity" of the "boast that we
have a Government of laws and not of men. 2 0
Preliminarily, one may raise an eyebrow at the propriety of any
report by state chief justices on the behavior of the Supreme Court
of the United States. The result is to make the conference of chief
justices, as Paul Freund put it with characteristically gentle wit,
"a corporate body one of whose functions is to vote in review of
17. Resolutions and Report of the Special Committee on Communist
Tactics, Strategy and Objectives, 84 REPORTS oF AiERicAN BAR ASSOCtATioN 607 (1959).
18. See 104CONG. REc.A7782-83 (1958).
19. See id. at A7783-87.
20. E.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
21. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
22. E.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The discussion
of the Griffin case is interesting. The holding was that if a state allows
criminal appeals, it cannot deny the right of appeal to indigents because

they lack funds to supply the necessary transcript of record, but must
provide them with a transcript or an adequate substitute. The report says

the case raises the prospect "of an almost complete breakdown in the

work of State appellate courts" (a prospect which does not seem to have
materialized so far). 104 CONG. REc. A7787 (1958). But at another point
in the discussion there is this admission: "Probably no one would dispute
the proposition that the poor man should not be deprived of the opportunity for a meritorious appeal simply because of his poverty." Id. at
A7786. If that is accepted, it is difficult to see what alternative the Supreme Court had to the outcome in Griffin.
23. Id. at A7787.

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.

26. Id. at A7788.
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the performance of their reviewer."2 The conclusions, moreover,
do not follow from the earlier discussion in the report and often
seem to bear little relation to it. Their sweeping character and
emotional tone are hardly good examples of judicial restraint. Is
it helpful--or lawyerlike-to throw at the Supreme Court such
slogans as a government of laws, not men? And in complaining
that the Court has nibbled at states' rights the report skips lightly
over highly significant areas in which the present Supreme Court
has been much more deferential to the states than were its predecessors. Professor Freund points out"8 that the Court has greatly
enlarged the power of the states to impose economic regulation,"
to tax businesses engaged in interstate commerce, 3 and to tax
property despite a degree of federal ownership."1 Are those powers really not more important to state government than a right to
harry a man invited to lecture at a state university about whether
he once belonged to the Progressive Party?3"
The report of the American Bar Association committee similarly
uses a broad and unlawyerlike brush, generalizing about problems
that are particular and distinct. The conclusion that got the headlines was: "Many cases have been decided in such a manner as to
encourage an increase in Communist activity in the United States
... . The paralysis of our internal security grows largely from
construction and interpretation centering around technicalities
emanating from our judicial process which the Communists seek
to destroy, yet use as a refuge to masquerade their diabolical objectives. '3 3 Apart from the impenetrable syntax, it is distressing
27. Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, Address at Brandeis University,
Nov. 12, 1958, p. 1 (mimeographed text).
28. Id. at 15.
29. E.g., Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S.
334 (1959) (Oklahoma law forbidding price cuts by chain which does not
offer trading stamps in order to compete with those which do held no

violation of the fourteenth amendment).
30. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358

U.S. 450 (1959) (state may levy a fairly apportioned tax on the net income

of an out-of-state corporation doing entirely interstate business in the
taxing state).
31. E.g., Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958), rehearing
denied, 357 U.S. 913 (1958) (state property tax upheld as applied to
"privilege of using or possessing" United States property, although the
state statute did not expressly cover such privilege).
32. The reference here is to Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234

(1957).

The report of the chief justices itself briefly mentions two other areas in
which Supreme Court decisions have represented dramatic victories for

"states' rights": the series of cases, climaxed by McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), relaxing restrictions on the in personam
jurisdiction of state courts over nonresident defendants, and the abandonment of federal decisional law as the rule of decision in diversity cases,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. Report, supra note 17, at 614.
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to see a group of lawyers describe statutory and constitutional
guaranties of fair procedure and reasonable governmental action
as "technicalities." And the contention that the Supreme Court

has caused a "paralysis" of our internal security, a paralysis evidently not visible to the naked eye, was devastatingly answered in
a report by a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York.3"
Of newspaper columnists who appraise the work of the Supreme

Court the most prominent is probably David Lawrence. He has
had this to say about the Court:
Traditionally, the spirit of America has been that if you do not like
the rules of the game, change the rules-but don't soak the umpire.
For generations the Supreme Court of the United States has been
the umpire in deciding what are and what are not valid acts of the
government within the meaning of the supreme law of the land-the

Constitution.

5

To say that this tribunal of nine men shall not henceforth declare
the supreme law of the land is to say in effect that we must change
our form of government and substitute the rule of passion for the
36
rule of reason.

If the quotation surprises those who are regular readers of Mr.
Lawrence's column, it should be added hastily that he made the

comment in 1937 in a book dedicated to "nine honest men." He
approved, then, of the Court's intervening to protect economic
rights. Today he heartily disapproves of the frequent intervention
by the Court to assure fair criminal procedure,37 free speech,'m
and freedom from racial discrimination. 9
34. 14 RECORD OF
NEW YoRK 241 (1959).

THE ASSOCIATION

OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF

35. LAWRENCE, SUPREME CoURT OR POLrrICAL PUPPETS 1 (1937).
36. Id. at 39.
37. E.g., Washington Evening Star, June 27, 1957, p. A19, col. 1 (metropolitan ed.): "Mhe Supreme Court goes on releasing Communists as
well as various types of criminals, including a confessed rapist, on technical
grounds described conveniently as 'individual rights.' The idea that society
as a whole needs protection against traitors and crooks is brushed aside,
and the 'individual right' is ruled to be supreme." The mention of a
"confessed rapist" is apparently a reference to Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957), reversing a conviction and death sentence for rape
because of the use of a confession obtained during an unnecessary delay
in the prisoner's arraignment.
38. E.g., from the column quoted in note 37, supra: 'The edict also is
issued by the Supreme Court that free speech includes the right to preach
forcible overthrow of the Government and that only when the conspiracy
is well under way and there is an actual step taken to overthrow the
Government can effective steps be taken to protect the Nation." This is
apparently a reference to Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957),
holding (in sharp contrast to Mr. Lawrence's version) that the Smith Act
does not prohibit advocacy of the abstract doctrine of overthrow of the
government but applies only to speech which is an incitement to action.
39. E.g., Washington Evening Star, Aug. 29, 1958, p. A17, col. I
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Once again, then, the results reached by the Court appear to
dictate the verdict of the critic. Many years ago Charles Warren,
the historian of the Court, concluded that most of the attacks
made upon it throughout its history had been based not on any
consistent legal theory or philosophy but on "the particular economic, political or social legislation which the decisions of the
Court happened to sustain or overthrow" 4 -in short, on whose
ox was gored. The situation today is no different. While the most
highly publicized attacks have come from the right, there has also
been a chorus from the left to deplore any decision sustaining governmental exercise of power against individual challenge." Henry
M. Hart, Jr. has accurately parodied the typical result-oriented
comment: " 'One up (or one down) for subversion,' 'One up (or
one down) for civil liberties' . . . .""
II. CRITICISM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A second category of Supreme Court criticism is assuredly not
based on results. It takes the position that the Court has too
broadly exercised its great power to review the constitutionality of
legislation. The foremost exponent of this viewpoint is, of course,
Judge Learned Hand. Disinterested, nonpolitical, intellectually the
most eminent of critics, he has given his position added force by
holding to it through all the changing results of the last several
decades.
In his Holmes lectures, 3 delivered at the Harvard Law School
in 1958, Judge Hand examined the origins of the doctrine of judicial review and the exercise of the power over the years. He
found the doctrine legitimate, but it is fair to say that his acceptance was grudging:
The arguments deducing the court's authority from the structure of
the new government, or from the implications of any government,

were not valid, in spite of the deservedly revered names of their authors. . . . On the other hand it was probable, if indeed it was not
certain, that without some arbiter whose decision should be final the
whole system would have collapsed. . . . In construing written documents it has always been thought proper to engraft upon the text
(metropolitan ed.): "Could the nine justices really be unmindful of the il-

legal manner by which the Fourteenth Amendment itself was inserted in
the Constitution and nevertheless order now that schools be 'integrated'
lest they be 'violating' that amendment?"

40. 1 WARREN, op. cit. supranote 3, at 388.
41. See generally RODELL, NINE MEN (1955). And see Cahn, Book

Review, New York Times, March 6, 1960, p. 3, col. 1, p. 14, col. 5:
"Nowadays . . . the Court tends to vote too often for validation [of challenged governmental action]."
42. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv.
84, 125 (1959).

43.

HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

(1958).
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such provisions as are necessary to prevent the failure of the undertaking. That is no doubt a dangerous liberty, not lightly to be resorted
to; but it was justified in this instance, fbr the need was compelling.44

As Herbert Wechsler pointed out in his Holmes lecture of 1959,
Judge Hand's views on the source of the Supreme Court's power
to review legislation condition his approach to the exercise of the
power. 5 Judge Hand says it "was absolutely essential to confine
the power to the need that evoked it,""' a need which he has
described as the preservation of the government. He says the Supreme Court should intervene only to keep a governmental department within its "frontiers," not to reappraise "the propriety of
its choices within those frontiers."' That view is hardly self-explanatory, but Judge Hand's examples are revealing. He frowns,
for example, at what must have been one of the Supreme Court's
least controversial decisions of recent years, Butler v. Michigan,8
holding that a state might not prohibit the sale to adults of books
found objectionable for children.4" Judge Hand concludes that the
Court has used the power of judicial review so broadly as to become, again and again, "a third legislative chamber.""0 For nine
men in lifetime appointive positions to exercise such power, he
says, is not only inconsistent with democratic government but
harmful to the Court, because involvement in what are essentially
political
matters inevitably lessens public reverence for the judici51
ary.
The proper role of the Supreme Court in our system of government is too large a topic for this summary discussion. But it is
necessary to indicate briefly, with all deference, where one disagrees with Judge Hand.
If his lectures are taken at large as a warning against excessive
reliance on the courts to do the work of democracy, then it is difficult to quarrel with the theme. Certainly it is too easy to say, as
so many libertarian observers seem to content themselves with
saying, that judicial activism in behalf of property rights a genera44. Id. at 28-29.
45. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1959).
46. HAND, op. cit. supranote 43, at 29.
47. Id. at 29-30.
48. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
49. "It may indeed well be asked why, if the end was lawful, as the
Court assumed, there should be a judicial review of the means adopted by

the legislature." HAND, op. cit. supra note 43, at 62. If Judge Hand intends

what he implies, that the means chosen by a legislature to reach a valid
end should be constitutionally irrelevant, he is certainly at odds with the
entire history of the exercise of the review power.
50. HAND, op. cit. supra note 43, at 55.
51. Id. at 72-73.
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tion ago was bad, but intervention in behalf of "personal rights"
today is admirable.5" But the negative tone taken by Judge Hand
really goes farther than a simple caution. It goes too far, in fact,
for there are more positive values in judicial review than he would
concede.
A.

THE COURT AS A FORUM FOR MORAL PROTEST

For one thing, the American tradition of courts serving as
forums for moral protest may not be unhealthy. In a country as
large as this one, and with legislatures-both state and nationalso frozen by inertia, litigation is often the best device to focus attention on moral considerations. In considering a general immigration statute, for example, individual members of Congress are unlikely to give much thought to a provision requiring the deportation of aliens who at any time belonged to the Communist party,
however long their residence here and however brief and remote
their party membership.53 In the abstract-where it is likely to re52. Perhaps the most cynical justification for intervention in behalf of
civil liberties is to be found in Black, Old and New Ways in Judicial Review, Bowdoin College Bulletin No. 328 (1958). Professor Black says:
Now we are sometimes told that we must be very careful not to
favor judicial vigor in supporting civil liberties, because if we do we'll
be setting a bad precedent. Later on, we may get a bench of judges
whose personal philosophy on economic issues is strongly conservative,
and they will avail themselves of the precedent of strong judicial review to strike down needed economic legislation. . . . [But] suppose
the present Court were to shrink from vigorous judicial action to protect civil liberties? Would that prevent a court composed of latter-day
McReynoldses and Butlers from following their own views . . .? Can
you imagine that a judge whose whole training and philosophy led him
to the honest conviction that minimum-wage laws were unconstitutional would hold back from implementing this conviction merely because Mr. Justice Frankfurter, years before, had commendably restrained himself from using the judicial power vigorously to protect
free speech?
Id. at 16-17.
One comment that can be made on this remarkable passage is that it
deals with an imaginary horror. If Justice Frankfurter, to use Professor
Black's example, has an honest conviction that a statute abridging speech
is unconstitutional, he does not hold back from implementing the conviction. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). The question
is whether a governmental act can be said to violate the Constitution. In
answering that question any judge must appraise the importance of the
interests at stake, and he will value some interests more than others. But
surely a judge's approach to the exercise of judicial review must be less
simple and less cynical than riding his prejudices as far as possible because
some day other judges with other prejudices will be riding theirs. For an
excellent discussion of the problem of weighing interests in constitutional
litigation, and a demolition of the claim by some judges that they apply
absolutes, see Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1 T1in
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 75, 78-80 (1960).

53. See § 241(2) (6) (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
66 Stat. 163, 205, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(2) (6) (c) (1958). The provision was sustained in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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main in the mind of the busy legislator-the provision has the appeal of being tough on communism. But as applied to a real human being, who came to the United States at the age of eight
months, 50 years ago, and has known no other land," the statute's cruelty is easier to see."s Of course a court is not empowered
to reappraise the moral quality of every legislative decision. But
is it not true that the relative remoteness of the judicial forum
from political excitements, the security of federal judges' tenure,
their freedom from sectional and party ties, and-most important
-the slow, deliberative quality of the judicial process all tend to
insure a greater concern for fairness to the individual than is ordinarily found in legislatures?58
B. THE COURT AS A CATALYST

Judicial review is sometimes mistakenly discussed as if it were
an all-or-nothing proposition, in which statutes are either upheld or
struck down. But in operation the power is much subtler, its radiations broader. For one thing, a court's attitude in construing a statute is significantly affected by existence of the authority to invalidate it. In recent years some of the Supreme Court's most significant decisions have been statutory constructions designed to avoid
constitutional questions--constructions that could fairly be called
strained.57 The effect of such decisions is to put the problem before Congress again, but to put it in such a way that Congress is
more likely to be aware of the values at stake when it acts.
The Passport Cases" and their aftermath provide an example
of the Court's role as a legislative catalyst. The Secretary of State
had claimed broad, indeed virtually unlimited, statutory authority
to prevent the travel of American citizens outside the Western
Hemisphere whenever he decided-often on the basis of undisclosed information 59-- that their "activities abroad would . . . be
54. These are the facts of Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U.S. 390
(1960).
55. See "Protests Rise Over Edict Deporting Two in Oregon," Washington Evening Star, Oct. 20, 1960, p. B5,col. 3 (final ed.).
56.
Does not the availability of broad judicial review induce all agencies

of government, legislative and administrative, national and local, mili-

tary and civil, to proceed more openly, with more conscious measurement of competing values and sacrifices, and with a deeper awareness

of the moral responsibility inherent in all choice?

Wyzanski, Book Review, New York Herald-Tribune, March 2, 1958, sec.

6, p. 3, col. 1.
57. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles,

357 U.S. 116 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Yates v.

United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
58. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

59. See Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
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prejudicial to the interests of the United States.""0 The Court found
no such authority. When Congress undertook to repair the asserted breach in national security, the bill which passed the House
narrowly defined the circumstances in which travel could be prohibited and required the Secretary, if sued over the denial of a
passport, to disclose all information on which he relied."'
The same kind of catalytic action may take place between the
Supreme Court and the Executive Branch. In June, 1959, in Greene
v. McElroy,62 the Court, construing the statutes and executive orders strictly in the light of constitutional problems, held that there
was no authority for an industrial security program which denied
suspected defense plant workers the right to confront their accusers. It took the Executive Branch eight months to draft a substitute program; for the first time its officials had to address themselves to the difficult problem of balancing the needs of security
against fairness to the individual. The resulting order assured confrontation except in unusual cases and on the personal direction of
a department head.6 3 Of course it was sad that it took a Supreme
Court decision to make the President and his aides face up to a
responsibility that had been pointed out by many critics, but surely
intervention by the Court was preferable to continued inaction.
The Supreme Court may affect governmental policy by calling
attention to moral considerations even when it upholds a challenged action. Examples are Bartkus v. Illinois64 and Abbate v. United States,65 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
successive federal and state prosecutions of the same man for the
same criminal act. Immediately after the decisions Attorney General Rogers, concerned by the possibility of prosecutorial abuse of
this newly confirmed power, announced a policy against federalfollowing-state prosecutions.6 6 The next term he went so far in
applying the policy as to ask the Supreme Court to set aside a
conviction which resulted from a second federal prosecution of a
defendant on the same facts-a conviction which apparently vio60. 22 C.F.R. § 51.136 (1958).
61. H.R. 9069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The bill passed the House
on Sept. 8, 1959, but died in the Senate.
62. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
63. Exec. Order No. 10865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960).
64. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Bartkus was acquitted by a federal jury
on the charge of robbing a federally insured bank and then convicted of
robbery in a state court on the same facts.
65. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). Abbate pleaded guilty to a state indictment
charging a conspiracy to destroy telephone lines and was sentenced to three
months in prison. Thereafter he was indicted for the same conspiracy under
a federal statute making it a crime to destroy communications facilities
operated by the United States; he was convicted and sentenced to three
years in prison.
66. See Department of Justice Press Release, April 6, 1959; New York
Times, April 6, 1959, p. 1, col. 4 (late city ed.).

1961]

THE COURT AND ITS CRITICS

317

lated no statute or constitutional provision and which was really
beyond the announced principle against successive state-federal
prosecutions.67 Even more interesting is the fact that the Illinois
legislature, a few months after Bartkus was decided, passed a law
barring the prosecution of any person for a criminal act which had
previously been the basis of a federal prosecution."
Even though the states have especially resented Supreme Court
interference in the administration of state criminal law, the best
of their officials might admit that the Court has inspired correction of what are, after all, not states' rights but states' wrongs.
As scattered and haphazard as the cases on forced confessions
and denial of counsel have been, surely they have encouraged the
improvement of state criminal procedure. Even as enlightened a
state as New York has been found wanting in recent years in its
handling of criminal suspects.69 It seems beyond argument that
the growth of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for constitutional
flaws in state convictions has served to reduce the number of those
flaws and to stimulate the development of state post-conviction
procedures. 70
C.

THE COURT AS A NONPOLITICAL ARBITER

There are issues which are better left to the ivory tower handling of a court than thrown into political debate. Take the divisive questions of church and state, such as the extent to which
the Constitution permits official assistance to religious schools.
Paul Blanshard has written that Congress is happy "to have an impartial agency speaking without passion in so controversial an
area."7 ' And that position has more to commend it than congressional timidity. The 1960 Presidential campaign has given us
a taste, a small taste, of religion as a political issue. Would it really be wise, in a country of diverse races and creeds, to seek political decisions on such questions as the permissibility of released67. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960) (motion of the Solicitor
General to vacate the judgment and dismiss the indictment granted).
68. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 601.1 (1959). Counsel appointed by
the Supreme Court to represent Bartkus, Walter T. Fisher of Chicago,

sought commutation of his sentence. On Jan. 3, 1961, Governor Stratton
commuted the sentence to time served. Letter From Mr. Fisher to the writer, Jan. 8, 1961.
69. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954).
70. See Schaefer, Federalismand State Criminal Procedure, 70

HAIv.

L.

REv. 1, 24-26 (1956). For a discussion of the effect of Supreme Court
decisions in spurring adoption of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

513-16 (1953).
71. BLANSHARD,

GOD AND MAN IN WASHINGTON

57

(1960).
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education?7 2

The unhappy history of
time programs for religious
bitter national conflict over the church-state relationship in the
countries of Europe argues strongly to the contrary. The Court's
relatively remote position, protected from political pressures, may
also enable it to deal more rationally and fairly with the problem
of internal security measures as they affect individual rights.
Louis Henkin has wisely observed that, in this security area, "one
sometimes suspects many in Congress are pleased to have the
Court73save them from follies which they deem politically necessary.)
One wonders whether race relations is not also a problem that
Congress has been just as happy to leave to the Supreme Court.
Certainly Congress abdicated to the Court from Reconstruction
days until 195774 the responsibility for enforcing the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments, and acquiesced in the long line of decisions that resulted. 5 Perhaps issues so divisive were thought
better entrusted to the Court than argued and forced to a conclusion in Congress, with all the strains the latter course would necessarily put on the legislative process. Southern Senators confide
today that they would rather see the President or the Supreme
Court accomplish some purpose for the Negro, however objectionable, than have the end achieved through legislation which will
put them through a Senatorial replica of the War Between the
States.
72. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (releasing pupils from public school classes for religious study in
other classrooms of the public school is unconstitutional governmental aid
to religion). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (releasing
students for religious study outside public schools is constitutional).
73. Paper read at round-table on constitutional law, meeting of Association of American Law Schools, Philadelphia, Dec. 29, 1960.
74. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, 5 U.S.C. § 295-1, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 1995 (1958), was apparently the first civil rights measure passed by Congress since the Act of
March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335.
75. The case-law developed as follows: Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880) (statute excluding Negroes from jury service violates
fourteenth amendment); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
("grandfather clause" permitting white persons to qualify as voters without
literacy test required of Negroes violates fifteenth amendment); Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (ordinance prohibiting white and Negro
residence on same city block violates fourteenth amendment); Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (state must provide equivalent legal training for Negroes within its own borders and does not satisfy
fourteenth amendment by paying tuition for Negroes to attend out-of-state
law school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Texas law school for
Negroes does not satisfy fourteenth amendment because it offers fewer
educational opportunities than white law school and does not have "qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school"); McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(Negro admitted to state university may not be required to use segregated
seats in classroom and cafeteria).
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D. THm COURT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY
Finally, there is the Supreme Court's vital and probably irreplaceable role as an instrument of national unity. Justice Holmes
doubted that the United States could survive as a nation if the
Court lost its power to invalidate state statutes.76 For all the
growth of federal power in recent decades, regional prejudices and
parochialism have hardly disappeared. It still takes a decision of
the Supreme Court to prevent a state from changing city boundaries so as to exclude Negro voters,77 or to prevent a state from
banning a film deemed "sacrilegious" by a politically powerful
minority in that state.7 s At least it is hard to conceive of Congress playing this role. Even Judge Hand saw possible justification, because of the dangers of sectionalism, for the Court's early79
construction of the commerce clause to permit a judicial negative
on state regulation of commerce.s ° Nor has the need for Supreme
Court intervention in the field of state taxation and regulation of
commerce ended.8" Congress has certainly shown little desire or
capacity to deal with the multitudinous and subtle problems involved.' One reason is that state and sectional pressures remain powerful in Congress; the Supreme Court is freer to place national
above local interests.
Ill. THE NEW ACADEMIC CRITICISM
With that inadequate discussion of Judge Hand's fundamental
challenge to most of our assumptions about the role of the Supreme Court, we turn to the third and last category of the contemporary criticism. It comes largely from law professors, and it
can conveniently be labeled the new academic criticism. Perhaps
in response to expressions of regret at the amount and quality of
76.

I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration

as to the laws of the several States. For one in my place sees how
often a local policy prevails with those who are not trained to national
views ....

HOLMES, LAW AND THE COURT (1913), reprinted in HOLMES, S'EECHES 98,
102 (1934).
77. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
78. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
79. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
80. HAND, op. cit. supranote 43, at 32-33.

81. An illuminating recent case in the commerce area is Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
82. But see Pub. L. No. 272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959), limiting state
power to tax net income derived from interstate commerce and authorizing congressional studies of the problem.
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professional comment on the Supreme Court's work, 3 such comment seems to have proliferated in the last few years. The Law
School of the University of Chicago recently published the first
volume of a projected annual journal devoted entirely to appraising the Court's performance. 4
Like Judge Hand, the academic critics do not talk in terms
of particular results.8 " Their premise is that the process through
which the Supreme Court reaches a result is more important than
where the Court comes out. The issue is not who won but why,
and how.
The depth of this belief was illustrated in Professor Wechsler's
1959 Holmes lecture." He discussed three Supreme Court decisions on race relations-the cases outlawing the white primary,"7
restrictive real estate covenants,88 and segregated public schools.80
As to their results, he expressed a personal belief that the three
cases had "the best chance of making an enduring contribution to
the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years."0 "
But he went on to question the results because he found the reasoning of the opinions inadequate.
A common theme among the academic critics is that the present Court cares too much about results and not enough about reasons. As Alexander M. Bickel and Harry Wellington put it:
The Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the
sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of
opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders that quite
frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they cite and
the results they reach. 91
83. E.g., Hart, supra note 42, at 125: "[N]either at the bar nor among
the faculties of the law schools is there an adequate tradition of sustained,
disinterested and competent criticism of the professional quality of the
Court's opinions."
84. The first volume of The Supreme Court Review was published in
December, 1960.
85. It should be noted that the academic critics do not share Judge
Hand's skepticism about the utility of judicial review in general or his
belief that the Court has abused the power and made itself into a third
legislative chamber. Professor Wechsler indeed began his Holmes lecture
by disagreeing with Judge Hand's view that there is no basis for the doctrine in the text of the Constitution itself; he also disagreed with the
approach to exercise of the power which necessarily follows the Hand
view. Wechsler, supra note 45, at 2-10.
86. Wechsler, supra note 45.
87. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
88. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
89. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90. Wechsler, supra note 45, at 27.
91. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAIv. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
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This branch of the new academic criticism can be captioned:
"The Court is saying too little." Unsigned and unelaborated per
curiam opinions and orders are particular targets. Professor Wechsler cited92 the series of per curiams following the Brown decision. The opinion in that case emphasized the special nature of
education and the psychological effect of segregation on school
children. Then, in subsequent cases, the Court struck down seggregation on beaches,93 golf courses9 and street cars 9 5-- all in
per curiam opinions simply citing Brown. What did the invidious
effects of segregated classrooms upon children have to do with the
segregation of adults on trolleys? The opinions did not say.
The Supreme Court's occasional use of per curiams in summary
reversals of lower court decisions, without briefs or oral argument,
has been widely attacked, notably by Ernest J. Brown. He wrote:
The very effectiveness of the tribunal, the respect and authority accorded its decisions, may be increased or diminished as its procedures
are or are not thought open and fair. Meticulous care to give adequate
hearing is consistent with-though it may not prove-the open mind
usually thought appropriate for judicial authority. 96
If one complaint is that the Court is not saying and explaining
enough, another is that the Court sometimes says too much. The
Chief Justice's opinion in Watkins v. United States" has been
criticized on this ground. It dealt in the main with the whole
question of legislative investigations, suggesting that the Constitution puts strict limits on congressional committees but coming down
at the end to what was really quite a narrow holding-that a committee must explain to a witness the purpose of its questions. That
some of the opinion was dictum unsupported by a faithful majority was demonstrated two years later, in Barenblatt v. United
States,9" when a five-to-four majority upheld the power of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities to question a teacher
about Communist associations.9 9
92. Wechsler, supranote 45, at 22.
93. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HAv. L. REv. 77 (1958).
354 U.S. 178 (1957).
360 U.S. 109 (1959).

99. The tone of the two opinions is so wholly different that it is difficult to isolate particular conflicts. Watkins gave a passing nod to the need

of Congress to obtain information, 354 U.S. at 187, but emphasized the
possible damage to individual interests:

[After World War II] there appeared a new kind of congressional
inquiry .. .. [involving] a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and
affairs of private citizens.

Id. at 195.

The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify,
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Professor Freund, a warm supporter of the Court, has been
mildly critical in this area. He has written:
What gives concern is . . . a tendency to make broad principles do
service for specific problems that call for differentiation, a tendency
toward overbroadness that is not an augury of enduring work ....
The law of the future is likely to be the law which earns its perdurance by the solidity and strength of its workmanship no less than by
its appeal to our ethical sense.' 00

Workmanship is a word heard often from the academic critics.
It is prominent in an article by Professor Hart which is probably
the most critical of all the new criticism. Among other things, Professor Hart says:
[F]ew of the Court's opinions, far too few, genuinely illumine the area
of law with which they deal. Other opinions fail even by much more
elementary standards. Issues are ducked which in good lawyership
and good conscience ought not to be ducked. Technical mistakes
are made . . . . [These failures are threatening to undermine the
professional respect of first-rate lawyers for the incumbent Justices of
the Court, and this at the very time when the Court as an institution
and the Justices who sit on it are especially in need of the bar's confidence and support.10°

Professor Hart's article is devoted in good part to the heavy
burden of work on the Supreme Court. He reiterates the oftenagainst his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference.
Id. at 197.
In Barenblatt, on the other hand, Justice Harlan emphasized the evil
nature of communism and the broad power of Congress to legislate and
investigate in relation to the danger. 360 U.S. at 127-29. Without any
real discussion of the interests, both individual and national, favoring privacy of belief and association, the opinion concluded:
[T]he record is barren of other factors which in themselves might
sometimes lead to the conclusion that the individual interests at stake
were not subordinate to those of the state. .

.

. We conclude that the

balance between the individual and the governmental interests here at
stake must be struck in favor of the latter, and that therefore the
provisions of the First Amendment have not been offended.
Id. at 134.
The Watkins opinion was also highly critical of the House resolution
authorizing the Committee on Un-American Activities and defining its
purpose: "It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution." 354 U.S. at 202. "An excessively broad charter . . . . [makes it]
impossible . . . [for the courts] to ascertain whether any legislative purpose justifies the disclosures sought. . . ." Id. at 205-06. All this was

explained in Barenblatt with the statement that the Court in Watkins had
discussed the authorizing resolution "only as one of the facets in the total
mise en scene in its search for the 'question under inquiry'...." 360

U.S. at 117.
100. Freund, supra note 27, at 21.
101. Hart, supra note 42, at 100-01. An amusing rebuttal to the Hart
article is Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HMv. L. Rnv. 1298

(1960).
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heard complaint, made by some of the Justices among others, that
the Court is partly responsible for the burden because of its profligacy in granting review of trivial cases. 2° The issue here, of
course, is the Court's now apparently well-established habit of
granting certiorari to review the evidence in railroad injury cases
under the Federal Employers Liability Act. To a majority of the
Justices such review is necessary to keep lower federal and state
judges from whittling away at the statutory right to jury determinations. 0 3 To a minority on the Supreme Court and to many
outside observers the practice is, as Professor Hart puts it, "a grievous frittering away of the judicial resources of the nation."1 '
Moreover, the Court is accused of bending the law in FELA cases
to achieve the sympathetic end of succor for the victims of railroad accidents, with inadequate regard for the propriety of the
means used.10 5
The whole question of judicial ends and means was explored by
Professor Wechsler in his Holmes lecture. In politics, he said, one
can perhaps tolerate ad hoc decisions, "with principle reduced to
a manipulative tool." But "the main constituent of the judicial
process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting
with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on
analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result.""0
It is Professor Wechsler's complaint, and others', that the Court
has been rendering too many ad hoc decisions, based not on neutral and general principles but on the desire to help some litigant
or class, without working out the implications of the decision for
other kinds of cases and the law in general.
These few samples of the third category of criticism should indicate that, for all its scholarly origins, it is by no means gentle.
The academics would surely accept as rigorous scrutiny of their
own work, especially because the imprimatur of scholarship gives
102. Hart, supranote 42, at 96-98.
103. For an able defense of the practice see Arnold, supra note 101,
at 1302-04.
104. Hart, supranote 42, at 98.
105. On November 21, 1960, in New Haven R.R. v. Henagan, 364 U.S.
441, the Court upset a jury verdict for the plaintiff in an FELA case

and directed entry of judgment for the defendant railroad. Concurring
opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas in Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S.
15, 16 (1959), and Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949),

which list every FELA case since the 1943 term of Court, show that there

were no similar reversals of a plaintiff's verdict in that period. The writer
worked backward through the Reports from the 1943 term and found the
next earliest such decision on April 27, 1936, Chicago Great W. R.R. v.
Rambo, 298 U.S. 99, in which the Court unanimously reversed a judgment
for plaintiff. Unless the survey missed a beat, therefore, the Henagan case
was the first in 24 years in which a railroad petitioned for certiorari in
an FELA case and won on the merits.
106. Wechsler, supra note 45, at 15.
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it a special air of authority. Some observations therefore are in
order.
One objection that can fairly be made to the recent academic
writings is that they often do not take cognizance of the difficulties, surely understood by the authors, under which Supreme Court
Justices labor.17 The pressure of time, for example. Justice Douglas, among others, has argued that the Court would not significantly lighten its workload if it abjured FELA cases.10 8 But even
if the Court were as rigorous as Professor Hart would wish in limiting grants of certiorari, a Justice would seldom have the time to
spend on an opinion that a professor would take for a law review
article on the same subject. How can a similarly exhaustive analysis
be expected? Another difficulty is simply that there are nine members of the Court. It is easier to please one editor than eight. Opinions that are hazy or duck issues may be so because a majority
cannot agree on something more definitive. Even if it is desirable
to make an opinion a general treatise on an aspect of the law,'0 0
the writer may be unable to do so without treading on the prejudices of his colleagues and losing his majority. It was Justice Story
who said that if the Court had twelve members, "I verily believe
• . . we should do no business at all, or at least very little.""'
And the Court gets inadequate assistance from counsel; as the
critics appreciate,"' the quality of advocacy is often low. Any
regular observer of the Court in session can testify that briefs and
oral argument in too many cases throw little if any light on the
problem, so that the Court is effectively told: "Here, we don't understand it. You solve it."
Occasionally also there creeps into the new academic criticism
a breadth of phrasing in contrast to the precise tradition of the
scholar. The strictures are so harsh, the language so sweeping as
to give the impression that the craftsmanship of the Supreme Court
107. But see id. at 20: "The Court in constitutional adjudications faces
what must surely be the largest and the hardest task of principled decision-making faced by any group of men in the entire world." And see
Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, I THE SUPREME
COURT REVIEW 1, 45 (1960): "I cannot leave the Court's efforts in this

field without a word about the extraordinary difficulty of its task.
. . . [A]ny decision must treat so many variables. The rest of us are
fortunate indeed that our job is so much easier and less responsible."
108. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 16 (1959). Mr. Justice
Douglas believes, in any event, that the Court is not overworked. See
Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L. Q.
401 (1960).
109. For an argument that this course is undesirable see Arnold, supra
note 101, at 1311-12.
110. Letter to Charles Sumner, in 2 STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPII
STORY 296 (1851), quoted in HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 238.
111. Hart, supra note 42, at 125.
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is at an all-time low. Is that really so? How does the Court's product today compare with that of some other, perhaps golden, age?
A. A BACKWARD LOOK AT A GOLDEN AGE
Any careful comparison of the Court's work at some other period with that of today would be an extensive scholarly undertaking. Pending such a study, it may be useful to make a brief appraisal of the work of one representative term in the past. During
the 1956 term, in an opinion deploring the Court's continued review. of FELA cases, Justice Frankfurter remarked that a comparison of "the current United States Reports . . . with those of
even a generation ago" demonstrated a growth in the difficulty of
research and decision."' The remark serves as a convenient if
arbitrary peg for a look at the past. Taking twenty-five years as
a generation, let us look back that far from the 1956 term and
appraise the three volumes of the United States Reports for the
1931 term.
So far as the intellectual calibre of the Court was concerned,
that may well have been a golden age. Hughes was Chief Justice.
Holmes was there half the term, succeeded on his retirement by
Cardozo. Brandeis and Stone and Roberts were on the Court. The
remaining members were those who came to be known as the conservative bloc, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler.
The first impression one receives from the 1931 Reports is that
the business of the Supreme Court was substantially different from
today's. Substantive due process flourished as a protector of economic interests. The Court decided 15 cases in that category during the term. It found unconstitutional a federal tax statute raising
the conclusive presumption that a gift within two years of the
donor's death was made in contemplation of death."' It held
that Wisconsin could not, constitutionally, combine the income of
a husband and wife for tax purposes if the result was to increase
their tax.' On the other hand, it happily allowed Utah to ban
outdoor advertising of cigarettes." 5 In those primitive pre-Erie"0
days the Justices were still blithely laying down federal general
common law. The Court decided five diversity contract cases and
three diversity negligence cases. Justice Brandeis, writing for the
Court over the solitary dissent of Justice MeReynolds, made no
reference to state law as he reversed a judgment for plaintiff in a
suit on a fire insurance policy."' A complicated question of Dis112. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 524,
547 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bachmann, 285 U.S. 112 (1932).
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trict of Columbia common law drew an impressive dissent from
Justice Cardozo. 11s Half a dozen bankruptcy cases were decided.
Many of today's recurrent themes are not to be found in volumes 284, 285 or 286 of the United States Reports. In the 1931
term the Court decided not a single state criminal case. Federal
law regulating labor relations and wages and hours-now provocative of much litigation that ends in the Supreme Court-did not
exist. Internal security was not an issue. There were a dozen cases
from the Interstate Commerce Commission but none of the other
regulatory agency business that is now such a staple.
Some things, however, have not changed. There were federal
tax cases-23 of them, many more than today. There were
three cases raising issues of inter-governmental tax immunity, six
on state taxation and five on state regulation of interstate commerce. The Court reviewed 11 federal criminal convictions. And,
finally, there were FELA cases-at least as numerous as today, but
with a different pattern of results. In 12 FELA decisions 11 judgments for plaintiffs were reversed, one affirmed. The Court found
no persuasive evidence of employer negligence in cases in which,
today, it seems unlikely that a single Justice would vote to set
aside the plaintiffs judgment. For example, a brakeman in a caboose was ordered to step off a train at night so that he could assist in an inspection; he was not told that the caboose was on a
trestle, and so he stepped into the air and fell down a ravine. No
negligence." 9
In general, the Court's business in the 1931 term could be characterized as less demanding intellectually and emotionally than today's. This is not to pretend that there were no great cases, no
deeply felt issues. Among the opinions that term were two of
Brandeis' greatest dissents-from Crowell v. Benson,"2 ' laying
down the doctrine that administrative tribunals' findings of "constitutional facts" were subject to judicial review de novo, and from
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,"2 ' holding unconstitutional a
Depression-born Oklahoma statute requiring official permission
for entry into the ice business. But there were many more run-ofthe-mill cases than there are now-commercial problems of little
significance to anyone but the parties, and of little interest. Nor
118. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201 (1932).
119. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Berry, 286 U.S. 272 (1932). A 1939
amendment to the FELA abolished the defense of assumption of risk. See
53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1958). But only two of the reversals in
FELA cases in the 1931 term were on the ground of assumption of risk
by the employee, and six of the decisions seem to be based simply on appraisals of the evidence by the Supreme Court. It is a fair guess that
today's Court would make different appraisals.
120. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
121. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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were there so many of the soul-rending issues of individual liberty
which fill the docket today, issues which precedents do not resolve,
which call upon a judge's deepest resources of wisdom, understanding and experience. 2
A second aspect of the 1931 term which quickly impresses the
observer is the degree of unanimity in the Reports. There were 152
written opinions. In only 26 cases (or 17 per cent) were there dissents; nine of the dissents, incidentally, were without opinion.
There was only one special concurrence m Contrast the most recent figures, for the 1959 term. There were 105 full opinions, 81
(or 77 per cent)
with dissent; and the Justices wrote 27 concur24
ring opinions.1
Aside from the statistical evidence of intra-Court agreement,
such dissents as there were lacked the bitter, exaggerated flavor
and air of impending doom now occasionally noticeable. ' Language was less strident, less argumentative." The exchange of
correspondence between Holmes and the other Justices upon his
retirement is so warm as to bring tears to the eyes of the reader? -7
All this bespeaks a largeness of spirit, a desire on the part of most
of the members of the Court, at least, not to let the real differences of view that did exist become divisiveness. It also implies
a good deal of restraint on expression of individual views, a restraint lacking today?2 Justice Brandeis, for example, surely
122. Some examples in the current (1960) term are: Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 277 F.2d 78
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 951 (1960) (constitutionality of
requirement that party register as Communist action group and of sanctions that follow registration); Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21 (4th

Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 361 U.S. 952 (1960) (constitutionality of Smith

Act clause making membership in organization advocating violent overthrow of government criminal); Braden v. United States, 29 U.S.L. WnwcK

4210 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1961) (validity of conviction for contempt of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities); Poe v. Ullman, 147 Conn.
48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959), prob. juris. noted, 362

U.S. 987 (1960) (constitu-

tionality of Connecticut law prohibiting use or prescription of contraceptives); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 176 F. Supp. 466 (D.

Mass. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 362 U.S. 960 (1960) (constitutionality of
Sunday blue law as applied to those whose religious views compel closing
of business on Saturday).
123. Contrary to what may be the impression, even decisions upholding
substantive economic rights against governmental action were not all by a
divided Court. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in IowaDes Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).

124. See Table IV, sections (A) and (C), in Note, The Supreme Court,
1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 97, 104-05 (1960).
125. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 389, 401 (1960); Perez

v. Brownell, 356 U.S: 44, 79 (1958); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
680 (1957).

126. See, e.g., Justice Holmes' delightful dissent in Hoeper v. Tax
Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 218 (1931).
127. See correspondence printed at 284 U.S. v-vi (1932).
128. See, e.g., Meyer v. United States, 364 U.S. 410, 416 (1960) (dis-
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did not agree with every word of every opinion which he joined in
the 1931 term. But he was sufficiently self-confident to believe his
reputation could survive without his recording every trivial disagreement. A recent book'29 makes clear how often Brandeis
had the strength to withhold dissent for the sake of institutional
solidarity, reserving disagreement for the great occasions and thus
heightening its effect.
A third feature of the 1931 term is the utter lack of sentimentality evidenced. The Court curtly rejected a narcotics offender's protest against multiple penalties for one transaction, 3 ' an
attack on inconsistency in jury verdicts on different counts of an
indictment,131 an attempt by an alien mother and her daughter to
return, after a trip abroad, to the home in New York which had
been their residence for many years' 32 and a claim by a widow
for her husband's life insurance. 3 It just as brusquely reversed
a judgment for a five-year-old boy who had lost his leg in a railroad accident,"' and it set aside a negligence judgment for a
widow because a federal court in New Hampshire had violated the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution in applying New
Hampshire law instead of that of Vermont, where her husband's
contract of employment had been made."' The FELA cases of
senting opinion); United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76,
90 (1960 )(concurring opinion); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177
(1960) (separate dissent); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546 (1959)
(dissenting opinion). A recent incident in the courtroom may be noted also.
A sharply worded dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter drew an oral rebuttal
from Chief Justice Warren, even though the Chief Justice had written no
opinion in the case. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 3 (late
city ed.).
129.

BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED

OPINIONS OF

MR.

JUSTICE BRANDEIS

(1957).
130. See Bloekburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (Sutherland,
J., for unanimous Court).
131. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932). This was Justice
Holmes' last opinion; it drew a lengthy dissent from Justice Butler.
132. See United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932)
(Holmes, J., for unanimous Court).
133. See Bergholm v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 284 U.S. 489 (1932) (Suthcrland, J., for unanimous Court).
134. See Erie R.R. v. Duplak, 286 U.S. 440 (1932) (Sutherland, J., for
unanimous Court).

135. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)
(Brandeis, J.; Stone, J., concurring specially). Professor Freund has noted
how Brandeis developed the full faith and credit clause in a series of cases
that resulted, by chance, in rejecting the claims of a widow, an orphan
and a working man. Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir,
70 HARv. L. REV. 769, 787 (1957).
[H]e was not a sentimentalist. He had never allowed his energies to
be drained, or his greater usefulness debilitated, by yielding to pity
for the individual case at the cost of a more inclusive rescue and reform. Least of all on the Court would he compromise his moral authority by succumbing to expediency, though it bore the face of grief.
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the term are also good examples; all were decided unanimously,

and seven of the 10 Justices who served on the Court that term
hard to find a conwrote at least one FELA opinion."ss It is not
37
terms.
recent
more
in
sentimentality
trasting
Fourth, one is struck by the straightforwardness, the dispatch,
the lack of self-consciousness in the opinions of that earlier day.
The Justices exercised their power in a matter-of-fact, no-nonsense way, without the fretful examination of the Court's role that
is sometimes found today.138 It took only a few pages, most of
them devoted to a recitation of the facts, for Chief Justice Hughes

(writing for all his colleagues) to reverse a state supreme court
and find some local real estate assessments unconstitutional on the
ground that land of differing values was systematically assessed
at the same figure. 39 The Court unembarrassedly overruled cases

upon finding them in conflict with what it considered the main

line of precedent, 40 or simply upon re-examination of the prob-

lem.'

It did most of these things with astonishing swiftness-

less than a month between argument and decision in many cases,
just 31 days for New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,1 " less than three
months for argument, reargument and decision of another hotly

contested case." 3 Opinions were less sophisticated than they have
to be today. They most often laid things out in terms of precedent,
with much less examination than today of the reasons underlying

the precedent, the considerations of policy.
Ibid. On another occasion Professor Freund put it: 'ro think of Brandeis
as a shining white Knight riding off to every call of distress is to confuse
the prophet Jeremiah with the all-American boy." Freund, The Liberalism
of Mr. Justice Brandeis, Address to American Historical Association, Dec.
28, 1956,p. 3.
136. Only Justices Holmes, Van Devanter and Brandeis did not write
an FELA opinion. Interestingly, the one opinion sustaining a judgment for
plaintiff was by that reputed lover of railroad management, Mr. Justice
Butler. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Borum, 286 U.S. 447
(1932).
137. See, e.g., Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959);
Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (1957).

138. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 298, 299 (1959)

(dissenting opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255, 266-67
(1957) (concurring opinion).
139. See Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U.S. 23
(1931).

140. See, e.g., Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 284 U.S.

296 (1932) (opinion of Sutherland, J.), overruling Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253
U.S. 77 (1920) and Erie R.R. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86 (1920).
141. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) (opinion of
Hughes, CJ.), overruling Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).
142. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See text accompanying note 121 supra. It
seems unlikely that even Justice Brandeis could have produced his 31-page
dissent a month after argument unless he had worked on it before the case
was argued.
143. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932). The case
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Now

How good, then, was the work of the 1931 term? The absence
of divisiveness is appealing to a reader of the Reports today, as is
the directness of manner, the unashamed exercise of judicial power. There is a sense of sureness in the opinions dealing with technical problems, though one technically unskilled cannot really appraise their craftsmanship. But just as many opinions as today seem
to have brushed lightly over the difficulties, and many ignored
policy considerations in a way that would not be tolerated today.
One cannot say that the average opinion in 1931 any more than
today "genuinely illumine[d] the area of law with which" it
dealt."' Of course there were the Brandeis opinions, but that is
only another way of saying that Brandeis was Brandeis, with no
equal then or now. Certainly many opinions were on a humdrum
level, dreary matter treated drearily, and cannot be fairly described as more intellectually satisfying than today's. Most important, the issues before the Court were significantly less challenging to mind and spirit than those of 1960.
One last thought. A look backwards in the United States Reports is a reminder that articulation is not everything. Results do
count. Take the FELA cases, for example. The FELA opinions
in the 1931 term, although somewhat more articulate than today's,145 did not any more successfully "formulate generalized
guides to decision" '4 6 of the question of how much evidence of
negligence is enough. But the predominant result-the reversal of
plaintiffs' judgments-itself signified a strict attitude on the part
of the Court toward the requirements of proof, just as today's FELA
decisions, however inarticulate, do inform the lower courts of a
relaxed attitude toward those requirements.
One may wholly agree with the academic critics that the judicial process must be one of reason and principle and yet recognize that a court may reach a proper result without at once being
able to agree on a fully satisfying rationalization. There are many
areas of the law, especially of constitutional law, in which it has
taken years and decades for the Supreme Court to work out all
the implications of a doctrine. The new and emerging problems of
produced a notable Brandeis dissent expounding his views on stare decisis.
See id. at 405.
144. See note 101, supra and accompanying text.
145. At least the FELA opinions in the 1931 term gave the facts of
the cases. The frequent practice today is disposition in a per curiam opinion which simply states the result, e.g., Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
361 U.S. 15 (1959), or gives a statement of facts so incomplete as to be
useless, e.g., New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Henagan, 364 U.S. 441
(1960).
146. The phrase is from Professor Hart's discussion of FELA opinions.
See Hart, supra note 42, at 97.
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today are as difficult as any in the past, and fraught with the
gravest social implications. Is it not understandable if adequate
articulation has to await a similarly slow, painful, halting process?
The Brown decision is an example. Whatever the failings of the
opinion, the result was not only proper but necessary. An earlier
Court, applying the sociology of its day, had found that racial segregation did not deny Negroes the equal protection of the laws because there was nothing invidious about the arrangement unless
they chose "to put that construction upon it."'4 But could any
rational person doubt in 1954 that racial segregation was a calculated device to exalt one group and debase another, whether
practiced in Mississippi, the Union of South Africa or -itler's Germany? A Court would have to be obtuse indeed to find nothing
invidious in a rule requiring Negro children--or Jewish children,
say, or Mexican children-to attend separate schools.1 18 Surely
Paul Freund was right when he said: "It is proving very hard indeed in some quarters to live physically with the Court's decisions;
in another sense would it not have proved even harder to live intellectually and morally with a contrary decision?"'4 9 The fact
that the opinion in the Brown decision was difficult to write, or
that the desired unanimity on the Court was hard to obtain behind a particular form of words, or that all the implications were
not foreseen-none of these shows that the decision should have
gone the other way, or indeed that a contrary opinion would have
been easier to write or more persuasive. It should be added that
neither do the difficulties justify the Court's abandonment of any
attempt at reasoned explanation in the subsequent per curiams.
CONCLUSION
This has been, on the whole, a defense of the Supreme Court.
But there is no intention to reject all of the contemporary criticism;
some of the academic strictures are surely justified. Even less is it
intended to suggest in general that it is bad form to criticize the
Supreme Court. On the contrary, no institution in the country
more desperately needs critics. A President or a legislator who
makes mistakes can be voted out of office, but not a Supreme
Court Justice. He is accountable to no one but himself. Nor does
he have the freedom of other office-holders to discuss his work
with experts in the field. He is alone and immune, and he may be
147. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).

148. For an excellent discussion of the school segregation cases along

these lines see Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L. J. 421 (1960). See also Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial
Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. I REv. 1 (1959).
149. Freund, supra note 27, at 3.
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peculiarly susceptible to vanity, to basking in the sunshine of his
friends' compliments.
So long as the Supreme Court has ultimate power in our system
of government, it will need the toughest criticism. So long as it has
disinterested judges, they will welcome criticism as intellectual
nourishment. But the criticism, like the Court's work, must be
held to a standard. It should be particular, not general; dispassionate, not biased; directed at the Justices' performance, not their
honor. Judge Hand again has said it for all of us:
[W]hile it is proper that people should find fault when their judges
fail, it is only reasonable that they should recognize the difficulties.
Perhaps it is also fair to ask that before the judges are blamed they
shall be given the credit of having tried to do their best. Let them be
severely brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will
take the trouble to understand. 10

150. HAND, How Far Is a
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 110

Judge Free in Rendering a Decision, in

(3d ed. 1960).

